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I. INTRODUCTION

"Naming and shaming," the process of exposing, publicizing, and
condemning human rights abuses, is one of the most important and
common strategies used by human rights advocates. In an
international political system where power is typically defined in
terms of military strength and market size, advocacy groups draw on
a mixture of moral and legal means to pressure governments to
improve their human rights behavior. In general, the mere act of
naming and shaming can promote human rights norms by reinforcing
the shared understanding that some types of government conduct are
beyond the pale.'

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law. Many thanks to
Chris Griffin and Daniela Pisoiu for their insightful comments, to Graham Cronogue
for superb research assistance, and to the editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of
TransnationalLaw for editorial assistance.
1.
See, e.g., Matthew Krain, Jaccuse:Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators
Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?,56 INT'L STUD. Q. 574, 576 (2012) ("In
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Naming and shaming may also work more specifically through
a dynamic of "rhetorical entrapment." 2 Moral and legal censure
pressure the targeted government to respond to criticisms about its
conduct either by expressing public support for human rights norms
or by signing human rights treaties. 3 Over time, advocacy groups
use such instrumental concessions to press the targeted government
further to stop its abusive practices.4 Words that initially appear to
be cheap gestures can, with the passing of time, have powerful
effects.
Some scholars have offered compelling analyzes of naming and
shaming, including cases involving Israel's human rights policies in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the early 1990s 5 and Uganda's
repressive policies in the mid-1980s. 6 Others warn that naming and
shaming can be ineffective and even backfire, moving authoritarian
regimes to shift to other more discrete forms of repression.7 Many
scholars argue that the efficacy of naming and shaming depends on a

sum, naming and shaming by HROs, the media, and IGOs works because it: creates
common knowledge about the abuses based or [sic] reliable reports; frames
perpetrators as violating international norms and as untrustworthy partners in future
interactions .... ).
2.
For more information on rhetorical entrapment, see Frank Shimmelfennig,
The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement
of the European Union, 55 INT'L ORG. 47, 48 (2001) (noting that rhetorical entrapment
results from "rhetorical action" in which "[aictors who can justify their interests on the
grounds of the community's standard of legitimacy are therefore able to shame their
opponents into norm-conforming behavior").
See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International
3.
Human Rights Into Domestic Practices:Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 16 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp &

Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999) (describing the process by which governments initially
become involved in the moral discourse for instrumental reasons).
4.
Repressive governments tend to engage, rather than evade, human rights
naming and shaming and become rhetorically entrapped because they miscalculate the
effects of doing so or because they are offered material inducements, such as foreign
aid, to make concessions. See Beth A. Simmons, From Ratification to Compliance:
Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE 48-49 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp &
Kathryn Sikkink eds., 2013).
5.
See Anja Jetschke & Andrea Liese, The Power of Human Rights a Decade
After: From Euphoria to Contestation?,in PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra

note 4, at 29-32 (citing Andras Laursen, Israel's Supreme Court and International
Human Rights Law: The Judgment on 'ModeratePoliticalPressure', 69 NORDIC J. INT'L
L. 413 (2000)) (describing Laursen's application of the "spiral model" to Israel's human
rights policy).
6.
See generally Hans Peter Schmitz, Transnational Activism and Political
Change in Kenya and Uganda, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 4, at 39-77 (examining the effects of naming and shaming in Kenya and Uganda).
See generally Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and
7.
Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT'L ORG. 689, 692-93 (2008)
(arguing that naming and shaming can produce unintended consequences in which
governments turn to less visible forms of repression).
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range of factors, such as the regime type of the targeted government,8
the type of actors doing the naming and shaming,9 . and the presence of
domestic human rights organizations in the targeted state.1 0 Finally,
some scholars have shifted attention away from efficacy altogether to
understand better why human rights advocates choose to shame some
governments but not others. They have analyzed the effect of factors
such as media reports," the presence of human rights organizations
in the targeted state, 12 the gravity of the human rights situation,1 3
previous reporting efforts, 14 and U.S. military assistance. 5 In all
these inquiries, scholars have devoted almost no attention to the
possibility that naming and shaming strategies are at times influenced
by a government's rhetorical response. 16 The existing scholarship
assumes that rhetorical entrapment is a one-way street.
This Article argues that, rather than being mere targets,
governments can and do engage in "reverse rhetorical entrapment," thus
shaping the strategies of human rights organizations. 1 7 Specifically,
8.
See, e.g., Jetsche & Liese, supra note 5, at 33-34 (describing the empirical
research on the correlation of regime types and respect for human rights).
9.
See James Franklin, Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism
on Political Repression in Latin America, 52 INT'L STUD. Q. 187, 204-07 (2008) (As an
example, "[h]uman rights criticism emanating from NGOs (both domestic and
international) and religious groups was slightly more effective at reducing subsequent
repression than criticism emerging from foreign governments, while criticism from
inter-governmental organizations was ineffective").
10.
See Amanda M. Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blaming: Using
Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs, 56 INT'L STUD. Q. 1, 13
(2012) ("[S]haming can have a powerful impact on basic physical integrity rights when
it is . .. combined with a domestic presence of HROs.").
See Daniel W. Hill, Jr., Will. H. Moore & Bumba Mukherjee, Information
11.
Politics Versus OrganizationalIncentives: When are Amnesty International's"Naming
and Shaming" Reports Biased?, 57 INT'L STUD. Q. 219, 219-21 (2013) (examining the
effect human rights reporting by media outlets has on international NGOs' likelihood
of engaging in naming and shaming tactics).
12.
See generally James Meernik et al., The Impact of Human Rights
Organizationson Naming and Shaming Campaigns, 56 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 233 (2012)
(building upon existing naming and shaming research by addressing the effect a
human rights organization presence has on "the international human rights agenda").
13.
See James Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, Transnational
Informational Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000, 49 INT'L STUD. Q.
557, 568-73 (2005) (empirically comparing the "severity of human rights conditions"
and Amnesty International's relative coverage of the abuses).
14.
Id. at 569.
15.
See id. at 571-73 (discussing the effect of U.S. military aid on Amnesty
International reporting).
16.
For an exception, see Jetschke & Liese, supra note 5, at 40 (summarizing
scholarship that focuses on government use of justifications and excuses as strategies
for shaping human rights discourse and recognizing that both strategies "can be quite
effective in undermining the strength of transnational advocacy").
In Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice, Leslie
17.
Vinjamuri argues that the discourse surrounding the prosecution of human rights
violators has recently shifted from being primarily "principled" or "duty-based" to
"results-based." Leslie Vinjamuri, Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of
International Justice, 24 ETHICS & INVL AFF. 191, 193 (2010). Vinjamuri attributes
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justifications for egregious conduct-at least when made by powerful
governments1 8-may draw human rights advocates into consequentialist
debates about the utility of specific rights-violating practices. Using the
case of coercive interrogation in the United States, this Article show how
Human Rights Watch (HRW) was entrapped by the consequentialist
justifications of President George Bush's Administration. In explaining
and defending its interrogation practices, the administration turned to
the "war on terror" discourse that aimed to deflect and undermine
human rights critiques. 19 For reasons of political practicality, HRW
could not simply rely on moral and legal naming and shaming. Rather, it
responded with its own consequentialist arguments about torture,
focusing specifically on three outcomes: 20 (1) the unreliability of
intelligence gathered through coercive interrogation, (2) the effect of
U.S. interrogation tactics in galvanizing terrorist groups and
influencing the interrogation practices of other governments, and (3)
the impact of coercive interrogation on the moral standing of the
United States and its ability to attract support for its
counterterrorism policies.
The normative implications of this shift to consequentialist
arguments are complex. On one hand, HRW's arguments about the
inefficacy of torture may have shielded the unconditional norm
against torture from being viewed by the American public as utopian
and divorced from the political reality of post-9/11 attacks. 21 At the
same time, when a leading human rights group treats human rights as
means not ends, it legitimizes, at least indirectly, the notion that
torture is, in specific circumstances, acceptable. 22 The logic of

this shift to a number of interrelated factors rather than either governments or
advocacy groups simply dictating the evolution of discourse. The idea for this
Symposium contribution was influenced by her Article.
18.
Human rights groups may be under less pressure to respond to such
justifications made by weaker states.
19.
For careful analyses of the Bush Administration's rhetorical and discursive
strategies, see Richard Jackson, Language Policy and the Construction of a Torture
Culture in the War on Terrorism, 33 REV. INT'L STUD. 353, 355-61 (2007).
20.
Consequentialism is a methodology that gauges the desirability of an action
based on the results it produces. This results-oriented approach differs from
deontological methodologies in that consequentialism does not inquire into the
character of the conduct itself. For more information on consequentialism, see
Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edulentries/
consequentialism/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) ("Consequentialism, as its name
suggests, is the view that normative properties depend only on consequences.").
Jackson, supra note 19, at 361 n.35. This point about the antitorture norm
21.
being viewed as utopian is also made by Oren Gross. See Oren Gross, Are Torture
Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 1481, 1554 (2004).
22.
This suggestion is specific to leading human rights advocates-groups
whose primary role is to serve as principled voices in a cacophony of power politics. The
argument does not imply that all debates about the utility of torture risk having this
legitimizing effect. For a discussion of this point, see Gross, supra note 21, at 1554 ("By
refusing to discuss torture, we do not make it go away; we drive it underground.").
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rhetorical entrapment suggests two reasons why this is so. First, the
very process, rather than the content of the debate, may contribute to
the development of a norm that supports a consequentialist metric to
evaluate the practice of torture. For human rights advocates, this is
deeply problematic if the public does not share HRW's view of
torture's inefficacy in protecting U.S. security. Second, just as a
government's instrumentalist rhetoric about human rights may
subsequently be turned against it, so may the consequentialist
arguments of human rights advocates. New studies suggesting the
efficacy of torture or new information about intelligence gained from
past practices of torture could undermine the credibility of HRW's
position, even as the group continues to denounce torture on
traditional moral and legal grounds. Yet, HRW had little choice in
deciding whether to engage the government's justifications for
violating human rights. Remaining silent in the face of
consequentialist justifications for rights-violating policies would have
risked signaling an acceptance of the government's logic. The U.S.
government's discourse thus pressured HRW to switch roles from
critical commentator to direct interlocutor with the White House.
After introducing the strategy of naming and shaming in Part II,
Part III briefly summarizes HRW's naming and shaming tactics
before 9/11, the U.S. government's defense of its interrogation policies
after 9/11, and HRW's subsequent move to engage in a
consequentialist debate. This cycle demonstrates how, in response to
the consequentialist justifications proffered by the U.S. government,
HRW shifted its discursive tactics. This Article concludes with a
discussion of the normative implications of this shift.

II. HuMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY: NAMING AND SHAMING

Described as "the most commonly used weapon in the arsenal of
human rights proponents," naming and shaming is one of the most
important tactics of human rights advocacy groups. 23 It involves

23.
Franklin, supra note 9, at 52; see Stephan Sonnenberg & James L.
Cavallaro, Name, Shame, and Then Build Consensus? Bringing Conflict Resolution
Skills to Human Rights, 39 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 257, 261 (2012) (describing the
mobilization of shame as a "signature advocacy methodology"). Executive director of
HRW, Kenneth Roth states, "The core of our methodology is our ability to investigate,
expose and shame. We are at our most effective when we can hold governments (or, in
some cases, nongovernmental) conduct up to a disapproving public." Id. at 262 (quoting
Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: PracticalIssues Faced
by an InternationalHuman Rights Organization,26 HuM. RTS. Q. 63, 63 (2004)). To be
sure, human rights advocacy NGOs use a variety of strategies to improve human rights
beyond naming and shaming, including influencing legislation, supporting civil and
criminal litigation, capacity building, and norm building. Id. at 263. See also Thomas
Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction and Overview, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 16 (listing in a table various strategies of human
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investigating human rights violations, usually by governments, and
raising public awareness with the ultimate goal of pressuring repressive
governments into changing their behavior. 24 Through issuing press
releases, issue reports, annual reports, media and action alerts, and
commentaries and letters, human rights groups are able to place
government misconduct onto the global political agenda.25
Naming and shaming can influence the conduct of human rights
violators either directly or indirectly. 26 In the direct pathway, shaming
occasionally leads governments to reevaluate their actions and refrain
from future abuse.2 7 Governments may respond directly to shaming
because they wish to protect their reputation, their grasp on power,
or their legitimacy.2 8 A second effect is more indirect: shaming can
provide incriminatory information to global elites, transnational
networks, and domestic civil society.2 9 This information, in turn, can
inspire political mobilization and pressure governments from above
and below.3 0 The strategic logic of change is, however, the same as in
direct shaming: negative exposure leads to government concern about
reputation, power, and legitimacy.

rights advocacy groups, including legal enforcement, sanctions, awards, arguing,
discursive power, institution building, education, and training).
Ann Marie Clark, The Normative Context of Human Rights Criticism:
24.
Treaty Ratification and UN Mechanisms, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, supranote 4, at 126 (describing naming and shaming as "shorthand for the act
of framing and publicizing human rights information in order to pressure states to
comply with human rights standards"). Although any actor can engage in naming and
shaming tactics, including states and international governmental organizations like
the UN, this Article focuses exclusively on naming and shaming by human rights
advocacy groups.
25.
See, e.g., Krain, supra note 1, at 575-76 (discussing the process by which
transnational advocacy networks influence government action and raise awareness of
human rights violations); Murdie & Davis, supra note 10, at 1, 2-3 ("HROs and other
INGOs were critical in first getting human rights on the international agenda.").
26.
For a discussion of the role of direct and indirect pressure, see Murdie &
Davis, supra note 10, at 2-3 ("Through the same shaming behavior that HROs use to
directly pressure a state, HROs are able to call on the international community,
including third-party states, individuals, and organizations, to help pressure a targetstate 'from above."').
27.
See id. at 3 (describing the ways in which shaming by HROs can influence
government actions).
28.
See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 3, at 14-17 (exploring the impact of
shaming on governments).
29.
Murdie & Davis, supra note 10, at 3; see Krain, supra note 1, at 575
("Domestic human rights activists seek to change severely repressive state behavior
but are unable to do so directly. They act to circumvent state authorities and hope that
international attention to their plight will lead to international condemnation of, or
action against, the perpetrators of abuses .... ).
For a recent summary of how naming and shaming indirectly influences
30.
government conduct, what some scholars refer to as the "boomerang model," see Krain,
supra note 1, at 575.
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Whether having a direct or indirect effect, scholars suggest that
naming and shaming works through "rhetorical entrapment."3 1 In
response to being shamed, governments may initially deny charges of
wrongdoing.3 2 If bad publicity and public pressure persist, however,
the shamed government often makes tactical concessions, such as
releasing some political prisoners, ratifying some human rights
treaties, or expressing a commitment to human rights obligations.33
Human rights advocates can then use these rhetorical commitments
to shame the government into adhering to its promises. 34 Targeted
governments may eventually internalize legal and human rights
norms rather than abide by them merely out of instrumental
calculations. 35 Naming and shaming is therefore not only a strategy
to influence government conduct but also a tool to shape broader
human rights norms.
Current scholarship on naming and shaming tends to mistakenly
assume that rhetorical entrapment constitutes a one-way street
where human rights groups shape government conduct and broader
human rights discourse but are not influenced by governments in
return.3 6 Some scholars are beginning to reassess this assumption.3 7
The emergence of post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies, in particular,
has prompted some scholars to provide compelling analyzes of how
governments have facilitated a "counter-discourse" about security,

31.
See, e.g., Schimmelfennig, supra note 2, at 47-80 (2001) (suggesting that
the expansion of the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe was the result of
rhetorical entrapment); see also Risse & Sikkink, supra note 3, at 16.
32.
Risse & Ropp, supra note 23, at 6. See generally Stanley Cohen,
Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials and Counterclaims,
18 HUM. RTS. Q. 517, 522-534 (1999) (discussing various types of denial responses to
human rights reports).
33.
Risse & Ropp, supra note 24, at 6.
34.
See Darren Hawkins, Explaining Costly International Institutions:
Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms, 48 INT'L STUD. Q. 779, 783 (2004)
("[S]elf-interested actors are shamed into adopting new positions when others
demonstrate the gap between professed values and actual behavior."). For an example
of rhetorical entrapment leading to improved human rights behavior, see Sieglinde
Granzer, Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and
Morocco, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 109-10. See
also infra note 3.
Risse & Ropp, supra note 23, at 7.
35.
36.
For a compelling critique making this point, see Jetschke & Liese, supra
note 5, at 35 (arguing that one of the main theoretical models of transnational advocacy
"did not allow for conceptualizing mutual persuasion or the interactive construction of
the meaning of norms" or "the possibility that various domestic and international
audiences might actually accept the arguments of norm-violating governments").
37.
Most relevant for this Article, see Andrea Liese, Exceptional Necessity: How
Liberal Democracies Contest the Prohibition of Torture and Ill-Treatment When
Countering Terrorism, 5 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 17-48 (2009) (comparing "norm
contestation in several national contexts under conditions of the war on terror").
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war, human rights, and how such discourse has served to "block"
human rights advocacy.38
An understanding of the blocking effect of government discourse
is not the same, however, as recognizing that governments may shape
directly or indirectly the naming and shaming and rhetorical
practices of human rights advocacy jroups. In a kind of reverse
rhetorical entrapment, human rights advocacy groups may
themselves feel pressured into engaging government arguments
about the justifiability of human rights violations, rather than simply
naming and shaming them. This Article explores one example of this
dynamic in Part III, analyzing HRW advocacy strategies with respect
to the Bush Administration's coercive interrogation program.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (HRW), THE UNITED STATES, AND
TORTURE: FROM NAMING AND SHAMING
TO CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENTS

For decades, HRW has been the leading advocacy voice naming
and shaming governments accused of human rights abuses in general
and specifically regarding torture. 3 9 Since 9/11, HRW has shifted
from its traditional blanket strategy of naming and shaming
governments that use coercive interrogation to a double-pronged
approach. Rather than insisting on the absolute prohibition of torture
as an end in itself, it has argued the case against torture on
consequentialist grounds. This incorporation of consequentialist
argumentation, this Article argues, was a response to the Bush
Administration's discourse justifying its coercive interrogation
tactics. 40 The shift-or expansion-in HRW advocacy strategies
attests to a broader point: governments are not only shaped by, but
also shape the rhetorical strategies of human rights groups.

38.

See Jetschke & Liese, supra note 5, at 40 (summarizing scholarship that

focuses on governmental use of justifications and excuses as strategies for shaping
human rights discourse and recognizing that both strategies "can be quite effective in
undermining the strength of transnational advocacy").
39.
See, e.g., Hafner-Burton, supra note 7, at 693 (highlighting HRW's
extensive employment of naming and shaming strategies).
40.
This strategy persisted into President Barack Obama's Administration as
well, but the Article's analysis focuses on HRW's publications between 1989 and 2007.
HRW continues to deploy consequentialist arguments about the Bush Administration's
interrogation policies. See Andrea Prasow, How Illegal Interrogations Hurt the U.S.,

THE DAILY BEAST (May 7, 2011, 5:06 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/
05/07/does-torture-work-how-illegal-interrogations-hurt-the-us.html ("We will never
know how much information the U.S. lost because it failed to use time-tested, effective,
and humane methods of interrogation.").
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A. Shaming Torture Before 9/11: The Crimes Speak for Themselves
Prior to 9/11, HRW's naming and shaming tactics entailed
providing detailed factual accounts of episodes of torture and usually
letting the brutality of such accounts speak for themselves. 41
Occasionally, HRW hnalysts highlighted the moral depravity and
illegality of the torture they described but did not engage in
consequentialist arguments. In 1990, for instance, HRW released
three reports chronicling the use of torture by the Chinese, Burmese,
and Indonesian governments that typified its naming and shaming
strategy. 42 The authors of the China report refrained from including
a discussion of the government's legal obligations. 43 Instead, they
provided a string of accounts by torture survivors.44 They also issued
a corresponding "question-answer" press release centering on the
psychological trauma and pain of one of the victims. 45 The Burmese
report similarly avoided legal or moral editorializing instead
documenting only the various forms of torture used against student
protestors and prisoners. 46 The Indonesian report, by contrast,
exposed the use of torture in prisons, framing the practice in more
explicitly moral and legal terms. 47 For instance, in a strategy of
rhetorical entrapment, the authors discussed Indonesia's failure to
live up to its legal obligations under the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules. 4 8

41.
For this analysis, I examined all of HRW's news releases and special
reports, available by microfiche or online, that devoted at least some section to
interrogation and torture practices. I examined these documents for the following
periods: 1989-1993, 1997-2001, and 2003-2007. I did not examine documents that
concerned related issues, such as extraordinary renditions and prosecution of
government officials. I focused on HRW because, in contrast to organizations such as
Amnesty International, it engages primarily in informational advocacy, such as
naming and shaming, and direct lobbying of governments not grass roots mobilization.
42.
See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Torture in China (July 1990),
microformed on HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: ASIA WATCH COMMITTEE, 2 NEWS FROM ASIA
WATCH (1999); Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Burma
(Myanmar) (May, 1990), microformed on HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: ASIA WATCH
COMMITTEE, ASIA WATCH REPORT (1990); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS
IN INDONESIA 31 (1990) available at http://www.usp.com.aulfpss/docs/indonesi908.pdf
(discussing the use of torture in Indonesian prisons).
43.
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Torture in China, supra note 42.
44.
Id.
45.
See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Yao Yongzhan: A Year in Chinese
Jail (Sept. 1, 1990), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/c/china/china909.pdf
(interviewing Yao Yongzahn about his detainment).
46.
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Burma (Myanmar),
supra note 42.
47.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA, supra note
42, at 31 (discussing violations of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners in the Indonesian prison system).
48.
Id.

1088

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46..1079

For many years, HRW steered clear of engaging consequentialist
arguments about the justifiability of torture. A 1992 report contains a
series of harrowing accounts of torture by the Egyptian State Security
Investigations Service (SSI).49 Foreshadowing the type of arguments
later used by the Bush Administration, the HRW report quotes one
Interior Ministry official's explanation: "We are dealing with fanatics
who use violence."50 Rather than engage the argument's underlying
assumption about the need to use torture to protect the public, HRW's
response directly dismissed the consequentialist argument on legal
grounds, underscoring the absolute prohibition of torture, including
during public emergencies: 5 '
It is undeniable that Egypt has faced internal violence attributed to
clandestine Islamist groups and factions over the last decade, and that
this violence-coupled with often-violent responses by security forcescontinues until today. But the fact that torture victims may be
suspected radical or violent Islamists does not justify the practice of
torture, which is proscribed by the Egyptian Constitution, Egyptian law
and international law. Indeed, torture victims' alleged actions and
political affiliations are irrelevant to this serious human rights abuse.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Egypt
has ratified, proscribes torture absolutely, even in the event of a public
52
emergency that threatens the life of the nation.

In a similar vein, HRW's purely moral and legalist naming and
shaming persisted until 9/11 and into the period right after the
September 2001 attacks. In a 1999 press release condemning
Belgrade's prosecution of alleged terrorists, HRW discussed the
defendants' claims that they had been tortured into giving
confessions and highlighted Yugoslavia's legal obligation under both

49.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: TORTURE AND
DETENTION IN EGYPT 10 (1992) (summarizing instances of torture by the SSI in Egypt).
50.
Id.
51.
The closest HRW appears to have come to engaging consequentialist
arguments about the need to dispense with human rights in the fight against terrorism
was in a 1996 report on Peru. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PERU: PRESUMPTION OF GUILT:
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE FACELESS COURTS IN PERU (1996), available at

http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Peru.htm. There, it noted in passing that such
arguments justifying detainment (not torture) were self-undermining:
We are disturbed by the view commonly expressed by government officials that
due process restrictions are a necessary price to pay to deal effectively with
terrorism. Some variant of this argument, that it is impossible to make an
omelette without breaking eggs, is used by governments of every hue to justify
human rights violations. Certainly governments are obliged to protect citizens
against arbitrary violence. But it is self-defeating, as well as immoral, to
arbitrarily deprive innocent citizens of their liberty as a collateral cost of
achieving that aim. Moreover, even those who participated in heinous crimes
are entitled to due process under international human rights treaties ratified
by Peru.
Id. This one passage, however, does not begin to approach the amount of space HRW
later devoted to responding to consequentialist justifications.
52.
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS, supranote 49, at 10-11.
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the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and its own penal code
without mentioning the consequences of torture. 53 In another press
release that same year, HRW condemned U.S. support for the
Colombian government, which relied on and condoned brutal tactics,
including torture, conducted by paramilitary forces. 54 The naming
and shaming in this instance was moral, not legal. 55 While
recognizing that the Colombian regime needed stability, HRW
authors argued, "It is much too early for the United States to climb
into bed with a force that continues to violate human rights .... "56
What is striking about HRW's naming and shaming of torture before
9/11 is the organization's evident reluctance to rely on any
consequentialist arguments in favor of banning torture. Consistent
with a traditional rights-based approach, HRW treated the
prohibition of torture as an ends, not a means.

B. 9/11, Torture, and ConsequentialistJustifications
Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration's discourse
on counterterrorism began to challenge the foundational premise of
HRW's naming and shaming tactics, which had treated aggressive
interrogation and torture as unquestionably illegal and morally
indefensible.57 The Bush Administration did not publicly challenge
the legality or morality of the absolute prohibition on torture.5 8

53.
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Belgrade Tries Ethnic Albanian
Students for "Terrorism": Defendants Allege Torture (Dec. 16, 1999), available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/12/15/belgrade-tries-ethnic-albanian-studentsterrorism-0.
54.
See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Sanctioning Brutality in
Colombia (Aug. 10, 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/08/09/
sanctioning-brutality-colombia (criticizing a U.S. proposal to provide aid to Colombia
without addressing paramilitary human rights abuse).
55.
See id. ("[The United States risks complicity in atrocities, covering its eyes
and ears to the pleas of Colombia's civilians.").
56.
Id.
57.
There is an extensive legal literature debating the Bush Administration's
interrogation program, and the justifiability of torture, particularly, under the tickingtime bomb scenario. This Article eschews that debate since its primary focus is on how
governments and advocacy groups shape the discourse surrounding torture rather than
on the practice of torture itself.
58.
See Liese, supra note 37, at 33 ("It is noteworthy that the American
delegation did not once indicate the wish or the necessity to re-define or to re-interpret
the prohibition of torture in the context of countering terrorism when discussing its
State Report with the Committee against Torture . . . in May 2006."). There, its main
strategy had been to challenge the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the
CAT in "situations of armed conflict, i.e. on operations in Guantanamo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq." Id. In private, some Bush Administration officials were more willing to
express explicit support for aggressive torture tactics. In now notorious torture
memorandums, then Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee narrowed the definition of
torture to instances in which physical pain is "of an intensity akin to that which
accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure" and stated that
international laws prohibiting torture "may be unconstitutional if applied to
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Rather, it relabeled specific tactics generally considered to be torture,
such as water boarding, as "coercive interrogation" and offered
numerous justifications for their use. 59 Three among them receive
frequent attention: legal arguments (the tactics do not qualify as
torture);60 exceptional necessity arguments (extraordinary times require
extraordinary measures); 61 and security-over-liberty arguments (the fear
of a "ticking time bomb"). 62 The most pervasive form of justification in
the Bush White House, however, was a narrow, consequentialist
one.63 In a systematic analysis of 781 executive branch documents
intended for public consumption, Daniela Pisoiu finds that both the
Bush and Obama Administrations cited the efficacy of various
counter-terrorism measures, including the Central Intelligence
Agency's (CIA) interrogation program, more than any other reasonincluding exceptional circumstances and legality.64 This "operational
effectiveness" justification, as Pisoiu calls it, is narrowly
consequentialist. 65 It focuses on the functional benefits of

interrogations." Gregory Hooks & Clayton James Mosher, Outrages Against Personal
Dignity, 83 SOCIAL FORCES 1627, 1634-35 (2005) (citing Elizabeth Eaves, Defining
Deviancy Down, HARPER'S 6 (Sept. 2004)), available at https://muse.jhu.edu/
journals/socialforces/v083/83.4hooks.html; Robert Scheer, Commentary, Tout Torture,
Get Promoted: Defending Cruelty Can Be a Career Booster in Bush's Administration,
L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at B13; see also Kathryn Sikkink, The United States and
Torture: Does the Spiral Model Work?, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 4, at 148 ("The US government never actually said that it was going to
torture or engage in cruel or degrading treatment. But its rhetorical positions were so
extreme that they went well beyond attempts to reinterpret the norm, and can only be
understood as a rejection of the norm itself."); Lisa Hajjar, Does Torture Work? A
Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice in Historicaland Global Perspective, 5 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 311, 330 (2009), available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doilpdf/
10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.093008.131501 ("This wealth of information makes any
serious denial that the United States engaged in systematic and pervasive torture
unsustainable.").
59.
See Ryder Mckeown, Norm Regress and the Slow Death of the Torture
Norm, 23 INT'L REL. 5, 14 (2009) (describing the 2002 torture memorandums, and
noting that then Vice President Dick Cheney defended water boarding by stating that
it is a "no-brainer" if it means American lives are saved); see also Hooks & Mosher,
supra note 58, at 1630 (quoting then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as stating
that "[m]y impression is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which, I believe,
is technically different from torture").
60.
Daniela Pisoiu, Pragmatic Persuasion in Counterterrorism, 5 CRITICAL
STUD. ON TERRORISM 297, 301-02 (2012) (assessing the frequency with which actors
engage in legal justifications for various counterterrorism measures). Scholarship
analyzing the Bush Administration's counterterrorism discourse is rich and includes
Jackson, supra note 19 among others.
61.
Pisoiu, supranote 60, at 301-02 (describing the exception argument).
62.
Liese, supra note 37, at 27.
63.
Pisoiu refers to this as pragmatic because this justification did not engage
normative questions or arise in the context of debates about security over liberty.
Pisoiu, supra note 60, at 302.
64.
Id. at 301-02.
65.
See id. at 302 (noting the "pragmatic logic" of these arguments and the
focus on "chances of success").
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counterterrorism policies rather than on their legality or normative
justifications. 66 The next two most frequently referenced explanations
by the Bush Administration were also consequentialist. 67 They focused
on broader outcomes, namely: the need to prevent future attacks and
protect public safety. 68 As Pisoiu writes, despite the tendency of
scholars to focus on the Bush Administration's nonconsequentialist
justifications, "The major 'player' on the argumentative field was not
exception, but rather operational effectiveness."6 9
Examples of the post-9/11 consequentialist logic abound.
Speaking in broad terms about the government's counterterrorism
strategy, President Bush stated in 2006, "As we work with the
international community to defeat the terrorists and extremists, to
provide an alternative to their hateful ideology, we must also provide
our military and intelligence professionals with the tools they need to
protect our country from another attack."7 0 About the CIA interrogation
program specifically, he stated in the same speech, "[W]e need to be
able to question them, because it helps yield information, the
information necessary for us to be able to do our job."7 A year later,
in response to growing criticisms of the interrogation program,
President Bush used slightly broader consequentialist logic:
There's been a lot of talk in the newspapers and on TV about a program
that I put in motion to detain and question terrorists and extremists. I
have put this program in place for a reason, and that is to better protect
the American people. And when we find somebody who may have
information regarding an - a potential attack on America, you bet we're
going to detain them, and you bet we're going to question them because the American people expect us to find out information actionable intelligence so we can help protect them. That's our job.
Secondly, this government does not torture people. You know, we stick
72
to U.S. law and our international obligations.

One year later, the administration was still relying heavily on
consequentialist justifications.7 3 Speaking about legislation that would
prevent the CIA from engaging in "specialized interrogation
procedures," President Bush argued that it "would take away one of
the most valuable tools in the war on terror-the CIA program to
detain and question key terrorist leaders and operatives. This

66.
Id.
67.
See id. (presenting data showing that, after operational effectiveness,
prevention (21 percent) and protection (20 percent) were the most frequent justification
patterns used by the Bush administration).
68.
Id. at 302.
69.
Id. at 305.
70.
Id. at 303 (alteration removed).
71.
Id. (alteration removed).
72.
Id. at 308 (alteration removed).
73.
See id. at 303 (offering a 2008 statement from President Bush using
operational effectiveness as a justification).
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program has produced critical intelligence that has helped us prevent
a number of attacks."74
The Bush Administration's strategy was to profess its support for
an absolute ban on torture while at the- same time using
consequentialist arguments for defending a practice that amounted to
torture.75 To be sure, this strategy was not new to the international
human rights realm. As Andrea Liese documents, the United
Kingdom and Israel have used a version of this strategy as well. 76
Kathryn Sikkink highlights what she has termed "the anti-terrorism
norm" when noting that the United Kingdom, Argentina, and South
Africa have all pointed to terrorism in the past to justify "the use of
extraordinary policies." 77
C. After 9/11: HRW and ConsequentialistArgumentation
In contrast to its reactions to prior government justifications,
HRW began to adopt a broader discursive tactic in the years following
9/11. Although it continued to rely on naming and shaming in its
news releases and reports on torture, its use of consequentialist
argumentation surged. This change did not occur immediately after
9/11, however. Two months after the attacks, HRW issued a news
release titled, "Torture Not an Option."78 It adhered strictly to legal
arguments, emphasizing the impermissibility of torture even during
periods of crisis.79 The next HRW publication concerning the United
States and torture immediately followed the December 2002
Washington Post expos6 on CIA interrogation tactics at Bagram Air
Force Base in Afghanistan. 8 0 In its news release, "United States

Id. President Bush also stated, "The main reason this program has been
74.
effective is that it allows the C.I.A. to use specialized interrogation procedures to
question a small number of the most dangerous terrorists under careful supervision."
Text: Bush on Veto of Intelligence Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/ 08/washington/08cnd-ptext.html.
See Pisoiu, supra note 60, at 308-09 ("[Wlith respect to public
75.
argumentation, the torture ban was constantly reaffirmed, while, of course, also
pushing the pragmatic argument, as if the two could miraculously coexist."); Hajjar,
supra note 58, at 330 ("This wealth of information makes any serious denial that the
United States engaged in systematic and pervasive torture unsustainable .... .").
76.
See generally Liese, supranote 37 (discussing the justifications of torture in
Israel and the United Kingdom).
77.
Sikkink, supra note 58, at 146.
78.
See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Torture Not an Option (Nov. 20,
2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2001/11/19/torture-not-option-0 (responding
to comments suggesting that torture should be permitted against September 11
detainees).
79.
See id. ("The prohibition against torture is absolute and applies even
during times of armed conflict or when national security is threatened.").
See Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
80.
Interrogations, WASH. PosT (Dec. 26, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html
(describing a secret CIA
interrogation center in U.S.-occupied Afghanistan).
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Reports of Torture of [Al-Qaeda] Suspects," HRW again focused
exclusively on the illegality of torture, underlining the criminal
liability of government officials who "take part in torture, authorize
it, or even close their eyes to it."81 In a more extensive report on
torture a few months later, HRW began to employ consequentialist
arguments. 8 2 At the time, the Bush Administration had not yet
developed a coherent discursive strategy of justifying its interrogation
policies; HRW, therefore, did not begin to use consequentialist
arguments solely in response to a shift in government discourse. Soon
after, however, the White House appeared to have rhetorically
entrapped HRW into challenging consequentialist justifications for
coercive interrogation with their own consequentialist arguments.
HRW could no longer assume that its audience shared its legal and
normative premise that torture is and should be proscribed under all
circumstances. Rather, it had to respond to government claims about
the need for and efficacy of aggressive interrogation tactics.83 That is,
to defend the legitimacy of an absolutist antitorture norm, HRW had
little choice but to address the utility-not simply the legality or
morality-of torture tactics.
I Since its first extensive report on U.S. interrogation methods in
2003, HRW has advanced three types of consequentialist arguments
about coercive interrogation: (1) it leads to unreliable intelligence, (2)
it increases global insecurity, and (3) it undermines U.S. moral
standing in the world, thus making it harder to fight terrorism
effectively.
In its first report responding to allegations of U.S. torture in
March 2003, HRW outlined not only the immorality and illegality of
torture 84 but also the unreliability of the information gathered from
torture victims. In a typical statement combining all three
arguments, for instance, HRW authors stated, "Indeed, most
seasoned interrogators recognize that torture is not only immoral and
illegal, but ineffective and unnecessary as well. Given that people
being tortured will say anything to stop the pain, the information

Press Release, Human Rights Watch, United States: Reports of Torture of
81.
Al-Qaeda Suspects (Dec. 27, 2002) (quoting Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of HRW),
available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2002/12/26/united-states-reports-torture-alqaeda-suspects.

82.

See The Legal ProhibitionAgainst Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar.

11, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/news/2003/03/il/legal-prohibition-against-torture#laws
(arguing that torture is an undesirable and ineffective means of gaining information
and maintaining security).
Polls taken between 2001 and 2006 found that between 32 and 61 percent
83.
of Americans believe that torture is acceptable in certain conditions. See Jackson,
supra note 19, at 361 n.35.

84.

See The Legal ProhibitionAgainst Torture,supra note 82 (explaining that

torture is universally condemned and illegal under international law).
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yielded from torture is often false or of dubious reliability."8 5 In a
rather rare philosophical departure, the authors further elaborated:
Torture is as likely to yield false information as it is to yield the truth.
Cesare Beccaria, the eighteenth century philosopher whose critique of
torture remains influential today, observed that when a person is
tortured, the "impression of pain ... may increase to such a degree,
that, occupying the mind entirely, it will compel the sufferer to use the
shortest method of freeing himself from torment . . .. [H]e will accuse

himself of crimes of which he is innocent." Beccaria also pointed out the
problem of using torture to discover the accused's accomplices: "Will not
the man who [under torture falsely] accuses himself yet more readily
accuse others?" [Beccaria, Cesare, Of Crimes and Punishments. (15
Nov. 2001).]. Contemporary law enforcement professionals concur.
Oliver Ravel, former deputy director of the FBI, has stated that force is
not effective: "people will even admit they killed their grandmother,
just to stop the beatings." Indeed, the unreliability of forced confessions
was one of the principal reasons that U.S. courts originally prohibited
their use. 86

Since then, HRW has regularly highlighted the diminished reliability
of torture-based intelligence. In a May 2004 news release on U.S.
interrogation policies, HRW engaged in classic naming and shaming,
highlighting how U.S. interrogation practices were prohibited on both
moral and legal grounds: "The prohibition of torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is absolute and
unconditional, in peace or in war. This dehumanizing practice is
always wrong."87 It then made its consequentialist claim: "Moreover,
resorting to abusive interrogation is counterproductive. People under
torture will say anything, true or not."88 Two years later, in a 2006
news release, HRW authors quoted a senior intelligence officer: "No
good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices. I think
history tells us that. I think the empirical evidence of the last five
years, hard years, tells us that."8 9
In a related consequentialist move, HRW has frequently argued
that torture increases global insecurity. This "security" framing

85.
86.

Id.
Id.

87.
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Time to Stop 'Stress and Duress'
(May 13, 2004), availableat http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/05/12/time-stop-stress-andduress.
Id. This consequentialist argument was not the only one that HRW
88.
advanced at this early point. In an implicit concession that torture might produce
useful information in emergency situations, HRW argued that the problem with the
ticking-time-bomb argument was its malleability, not the practice of torture itself.
"[Tihe problem with this 'ticking bomb' scenario is that it is infinitely elastic.... The
slope is very slippery." Id. In later publications, HRW did not rely on the "slippery
slope" consequentialist argument.
89.
Press Release, Jennifer Daskal, Human Rights Watch, Detainee
Legislation Clearly Outlaws "Alternative" Interrogation Techniques (Nov. 8, 2006),
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/11/07/detainee-legislation-clearly-outlawsalternative-interrogation-techniques (quoting U.S. Army General Jeff Kimmons).
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sometimes emphasizes that U.S. interrogation practices can backfire,
fueling terrorism rather than suppressing it. In a June 2004 report,
in addition to its traditional legal naming and shaming, HRW
insisted:
Ironically, the administration is now finding that it may be losing the
war for hearts and minds around the world precisely because it threw
those rules out. Rather than advance the war on terror, the widespread
prisoner abuse has damaged efforts to build global support for
countering terrorism. Indeed, each new photo of an American soldier
humiliating an Iraqi could be considered a recruiting poster for alQaeda. Policies adopted to make the United States more secure from
90
terrorism have in fact made it more vulnerable.

In a news release five months later, it reiterated the same point:
"Despite the information apparently gleaned from some of these
suspects, overall the U.S. treatment of its prisoners has been a boon
rather than a setback for Al Qaeda, and has thereby made the world
less safe from terror."91 Less than a year later, it echoed, "One of the
dangerous results of the now tarnished image of the United States is
that it plays into the hands of politicians who stoke religious anger in
the Muslim world. They have used accounts of U.S. detainee abuse,
as well as the single Newsweek story, to foment discord against
governments allied with the United States." 92 In a July 2006 report,
HRW Executive Director Kenneth Roth asked, "Are we really safer
when our governments' investigative technique becomes a boon for
terrorist recruiters, arguably generating more terrorists than it
stops?"9 3
U.S. interrogation practices also contribute to global insecurity,
HRW argued, by setting a precedent for other governments, which in
turn puts U.S. military at risk. In an October 2003 news release,
HRW highlighted how U.S. interrogation and torture policies had
"invited" countries, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, to engage in
similar practices and had put U.S. military in a vulnerable position.
The report noted that "the torture and 'disappearance' of prisoners by

90.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 4 (2004).

Press Release, Reed Brody, Human Rights Watch, Prisoners Who
91.
Disappear (Oct. 13, 2004), availableat http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/10/12/prisonerswho-disappear.
Press Release, Saman Zia-Zarifi & John Sifton, Human Rights Watch, A
92.
Genuine Inquiry Into Abuses (May 22, 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/
2005/05/21/genuine-inquiry-abuses; see also Press Release, Tom Porteous, Human
Rights Watch, A Fig Leaf for Britain (Feb. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/02/26/fig-leaf-britain ("Extremist groups like al-Qaida
have long been led and inspired by victims of state torture. .. . None of that makes us
any the safer.").
Press Release, Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Watch, Who Profits the Most
93.
from Torture (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/07/13/whoprofits-most-torture ("One of the dangerous results of the now tarnished image of the
United States is that is plays into the hands of politicians who stoke religious anger in
the Muslim world.").
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the United States invites all the unsavory governments in the world
to do the same. Indeed, countries from Sudan to Zimbabwe have
already cited Abu Ghraib and other U.S. actions to justify their own
practices or to blunt criticism." 94 In an April 2005 report, HRW
stated, "Indeed, when a government as dominant and influential as
that of the United States openly defies laws prohibiting torture,

. .

. it

virtually invites others to do the same."9 5 And a few months later it
repeated the same point: "Making the Geneva Conventions optional
and failing to properly punish those responsible for war crimes will
place captured American soldiers and civilians in future wars at
greater risk."9 6
HRW's final consequentialist argument appears to overlap with
a moral one but is in fact distinct. This claim focuses on the
implications of interrogation practices for the United States' moral
standing on the global stage. Rather than caring about moral
standing for its own sake, however, HRW warned that a tarnished
reputation would impede the United States' ability to fight terrorism
effectively.9 7 For instance, in a 2004 report, HRW observed, "If the
United States embraces the torture and 'disappearance' of its
opponents, it abandons its ideals . . . and becomes a lesser nation."9 8
It then goes on to extend the implications of this abandonment:
"Maintaining the moral high ground and winning what Brown calls
the 'struggle of ideas and ideals' are also essential in the high-stakes
struggle with terrorist recruiters."9 9 In a different news release, HRW

94.

Press Release, Prisoners Who Disappear, supra note 91.

95.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNITED STATES: GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE:
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES 5 (2011).

96.
Press Release, James Ross, Human Rights Watch, Bush, Torture and
Lincoln's Legacy (Aug. 1, 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/07/31/bushtorture-and-lincoln-s-legacy. A 2007 news release reiterated that "[t]his attempt to
legalize torture has also put American military personnel and civilians serving
overseas in grave danger" and that "[t]he Justice Department's painstaking efforts to
legalize torture has also undermined American security." Later in the news release, the
authors continued, "By stating that methods that have long been deemed torture are
legal, the Department of Justice has essentially stated that it would be okay for a
foreign force to utilize the same tactics on a captured American." Press Release,
Jennifer Daskal, Human Rights Watch, The Next Attorney General Must Renounce
Torture (Oct. 16, 2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/10/15/nextattorney-general-must-renounce-torture.
97.
HRW, of course, is not the only one to advance this type of consequentialist
claim. Indeed, in one of its reports, HRW quotes the 9/11 Commission statement that
"allegations that the United States abused prisoners in its custody make it harder to
build the diplomatic, political, and military alliances the government will need." Press
Release, Prisoners Who Disappear, supra note 91.
98.
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Detained al-Qaeda Suspects
"Disappeared" (Oct. 12, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/10/12/usdetained-al-qaeda-suspects-disappeared-0.
99.
Kenneth Roth, Tap, Tap, Tap to Wear Down the Terrorists, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 9, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/08/tap-tap-tap-wear-downterrorists.

2013/

RfVERSE-RHETORJCAL ENTRAPMENT

1097

authors state: "[W]hatever marginal advantage interrogators might
gain by applying these techniques is vastly outweighed by the global
disgust at American use of them."100
HRW's turn to consequentialist rhetorical questions attests to a
dynamic that most scholars have neglected. Naming and shaming can
pressure and rhetorically entrap governments into engaging
criticisms about their human rights practices; yet, governments do
not lack discursive strategies of their own. Consequentialist
justifications for practices like coercive interrogation to some extent
shield governments from the costs typically associated with being
publicly named and shamed, including increased public opposition, a
tarnished reputation, and a loss of legitimacy. More importantly,
governments can shift the terms of the debate. To respond to
government discourse, human rights advocacy groups are forced away
from their moral and legal terrain and onto less familiar
instrumentalist grounds and argumentation.
IV. CONCLUSION-NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

With polls suggesting that between 36 and 61 percent of
Americans support the use of torture under specific circumstances,10 1
HRW was right to tailor its discursive strategy in response to the
Bush Administration's consequentialist justifications. Merely
reiterating its moral and legal condemnations of torture would have
rung hollow for many Americans. 102 But HRW's rhetorical shift has

100.
Press Release, Time to Stop 'Stress and Duress', supra note 87. In a 2006
report, Executive Director Kenneth Roth asks:
Are we really safer when, by equating counterterrorism with a technique that
many abhor, our governments discourage the public cooperation-the
volunteered tips about suspicious activity-that experts say is far more
important for cracking secretive conspiracies than anything wrung from a
suspect? . . . Are we really safer when the loss of the moral high ground leaves
our governments less able to dissuade dictators from closing the avenues for
peaceful political change that might discourage resort to.violence?
Press Release, Who Profits the Most from Torture, supra note 93.
See Poll Finds Support for Use of Torture in War on Terror, WASH. TIMES
101.
(Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/dec/6/20051206-1140423526r/?page=all ("On the issue of torture, 61 percent of Americans refused to rule it
out."); World Citizens Reject Torture, Global Poll Reveals, BBC WORLD SERV.,
(last visited Aug. 5, 2013)
http://www.globescan.com/newsarchives/bbetorture06/
(citing poll results that suggest 36 percent of Americans favor torture in certain
circumstances); Why Torture Makes us Less Safe, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/torture-on-tv/less-safe/
(last visited Sept. 29, 2013) (referencing a poll that shows that 61 percent of Americans
approve of torture in rare occasions).
102.
Oren Gross makes precisely this point with respect to legal scholars
debating the justifiability of torture. Gross, supra note 21, at 1554 ("Moreover, by
refusing to acknowledge that the notion of torture is more complex than many
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come at a price. When one of the world's leading human rights groups
employs consequentialist justifications for an absolute ban on torture,
the message it conveys is two fold: torture is never effective, and
efficacy is a valid yardstick for judging torture. The price is this:
HRW may not persuade the public of the first message, and its second
message may legitimize efficacy as a criterion to evaluate the use of
torture. Beyond this legitimizing effect, consequentialist justifications
run the risk of later being proved wrong. Were this to occur, the
antitorture norm would be weakened and probably more so than if it
had been endorsed exclusively on legal and moral grounds.
Some scholars suggest an alternative. Far from undermining
the norm against torture, government discourse and the
surrounding debate about coercive interrogation policies may in fact
have strengthened it. Liese, for instance, claims that "[a]lthough
subject to contestation, the international prohibition of torture has
neither been renegotiated nor reformulated. Rather, there are signs
10 She points
of a strengthening of international law on the issue."o
to evidence such as the adoption of an Optional Protocol for CAT,
the establishment of a special rapporteur at the United Nations,
and the creation of some regional level organizations.10 4 In her view,
"the meaning of the ban on torture and its surrounding
rules ... has not changed at all."' 0 5 Sikkink writes that although
the Bush Administration adhered to its support for aggressive
interrogation even in the face of domestic and international
pressure, the Obama Administration has reversed course and "moved
the United States back to both prescriptive status and rule consistent
behavior ... ." 1oe In this view, consequentialist justifications for
torture-and presumably consequentialist challenges to those
justifications-do not threaten the moral and legal foundation of
human rights norms that have been widely embraced.
Yet, if discourse matters in the way that scholars of naming and
shaming suggest, then it is not clear why human rights advocacy
groups should be any more immune from discursive engagements
than governments and why human rights norms should be any more
insulated. Consistent with models that explain how tactical
concessions by governments can lead to rhetorical entrapment,

supporters of the 'torture-is-banned-and-that-is-all-there-is-to-it' approach would have
us believe, we run the risk of having the general public perceive the legal system as
either utopian or hypocriticaL").
103.
Liese, supra note 37, at 35.
See id. (listing recent agreements that maintain a prohibition on torture).
104.
105.
Id. at 22 ("Despite this cross-national contestation, the meaning of the ban
on torture and its surrounding rules, as held and promoted by transnational networks
and legal bodies, has not changed at all.").
Sikkink also notes, however, that the Obama Administration had not
106.
renounced extraordinary rendition, nor shut down Guantanamo or Bagram, nor sought
to prosecute Bush Administration officials. Sikkink, supranote 58, at 160-61.
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instrumentalist argumentation by advocacy groups can boomerang in
ways that undermine their rhetorical stance and substantive
arguments. 0 7 Ultimately, it may be years before the dynamics of
reverse rhetorical entrapment and the shift to a consequentialist
discourse take effect. As Regina Heller and her coauthors suggest,
whether the U.S. government's rhetoric has undermined the norm
against torture is "an empirical question and cannot be decided on
purely conceptual grounds." 08 They argue for the possibility that
"under 'usual' contestation processes norms get only temporarily off
balance and may ultimately lead to the reaffirmation of the
established norm."1 09 Global and domestic consternation over the
Bush Administration's torture policy may have pushed the
antitorture norm back to its more secure, unconditional status. The
tug of war of moral, legal, and consequentialist discourse and the
reciprocal discursive interaction between governments and human
rights organizations are substantively important and real. Its
implication for the status of a given norm is, however, politically
uncertain.

107.
See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 3, at 18 ("A 'boomerang' pattern of
influence exists when domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their state and
directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from
outside.").
108.
Regina Heller, Martin Kahl & Daniela Pisoiu, The Dark' Side of Normative
Argumentation-The Case of CounterterrorismPolicy, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
278, 283 (2012).
109.
Id.

